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Accountability or Attestation? An Assessment of Butler’s Ethical Subject with the 
Help of Ricoeur
In Giving an Account of Oneself (2005) Judith Butler investigates the possibility of 
ethics starting from a poststructuralist subject position. Whereas in earlier works, 
with concepts such as “performativity,” Butler put the ethical and critical capacities 
of the subject into perspective, works such as Giving an Account of Oneself, Precarious 
Life (2004) and to some extent Antigone’s Claim (2000), give the impression of a “turn” 
to ethics. 
In the paper I will evaluate Butler’s notion of the ethical subject by confronting 
it with Ricoeur’s ethical self, as developed mainly in Oneself as Another (1992). In the 
first part, I will describe the features of Butler’s “turn to ethics” and will demonstrate 
that for her ethics is not a separate sphere, apart from politics, but is located within
the political sphere. As a consequence, Butler’s ethical work is consistent with the 
earlier notions of performativity (Bodies That Matter 1993) and social existence (The 
Psychic Life of Power 1997). In the second part of the paper, I will concentrate upon 
Ricoeur’s ethical notion of the self, and show its relevance for feminist theory. In the 
last part, I will confront Butler’s notion of accountability with Ricoeur’s notion of 
attestation.
Butler’s Political Ethics
In Giving an Account of Oneself Judith Butler investigates the possibilities of an ethics 
starting from a poststructuralist subject position. Whereas in earlier works she 
reflected upon the performative process in which the subject comes into existence 
(1993) and upon its social existence (1997), in her recent works she explicitly speaks 
of ethical subjectivity and responsibility. She asks whether a theory of subject-
formation that acknowledges the limits of self-knowledge can work in the service of 
a conception of ethics: “Does the postulation of a subject who is not self-grounding, 
that is, whose conditions of emergence can never be fully accounted for, undermine 
the possibility of responsibility and, in particular, of giving an account of oneself?” 
(2005: 19).  
Butler shows the close connection between ethics and politics, responsibility 
and critique, which implies that her “ethical turn” is in line with her earlier works. 
Giving an account of oneself takes place within power relationships. The ethical 
demand gives rise to the political account, she claims in discussing Foucault’s notion 
of parrhesia (telling the truth about oneself). Ethics is not credible unless it becomes 
critique. But what does that imply for ethical subjectivity?
For Butler the ethical subject comes into existence in a response to someone 
else’s query or attribution, and its account takes the form of a narrative. She does not 
consider the narrative as reflection after the deed, but claims that it constitutes “the 
prerequisite condition for any account of moral agency we might give” (2005: 12). 
Therefore, narrative capacity constitutes a precondition for giving an account of 
oneself and assuming responsibility for one’s actions.  In a dialogue with Nietzsche’s 
and Foucault’s account of morality, she develops her notion of ethical subjectivity 
into one that implies a creative impulse, but is not a self-berating psychic agency. It is 
“neither fully determined, nor radically free” (2005: 19). 
For Ricoeur ethical subjectivity includes narrativity as well. Personal identity 
is narrative for him, and narrative identity forms the mediator between idem and ipse,
between sameness and selfhood. Idem identity is the permanency of fingerprints, or 
one’s genetic code, and on the psychological level of one’s character, while ipse
identity refers to the willed and sustained constancy of the promise that one holds on 
to even if everything around oneself, including one’s inclinations, have changed 
(1992: 124). For Ricoeur ipse expresses a self-constancy that can only be inscribed in 
the dimension of “who?”, and that has nothing to do with the permanence of time 
that characterizes idem, or character. 
Narrative identity combines idem and ipse for Ricoeur: it implies a dialectic 
between self constancy and the relative non-constancy of the promise. But the ethical 
subject is developed by him as ipse, rather than as constant idem. It is the attesting self 
that is ethical, the self that responds to accusation in the form of “It’s me here”. It is 
not a self same I that for Ricoeur constitutes ethical subjectivity, but the self that 
trusts in itself to say and act, and that only has a relative self assurance. 
In confronting Butler’s and Ricoeur’s notion of ethical subjectivity, I aim at 
examining Butler’s notion subject. To the extent that her ethical self is characterised 
by dispossession of itself, it seems to be only idem identity. As a self, that constitutes 
itself in the process of reiterating social norms, it is a what, rather than a who. But in 
so far as ethics requires risking ourselves, in the divergence of what conditions us 
and what lies before us, it seems closer to ipse. 
Both notions of ethical subjectivity give way to different ethics: Butler 
develops an ethics of accountability, Ricoeur an ethics of attestation. In the paper, I 
will not only reflect upon the relations between both ethics, but also ask which one is 
more fruitful from a feminist perspective.
